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Introduction
Wouldn’t it be ironic if Donald Trump were to go down in history
as “the human rights president”? Given Amnesty International’s
conclusion that President Trump’s policies mark a “new era of human
rights regression,” 1 such a proposition may seem far-fetched. But this
essay suggests that the April 14, 2018 airstrikes that he ordered on
Syria, to prevent its use of chemical weapons, may have crystallized
an emerging customary norm of humanitarian intervention, thereby
representing a historic development in international human rights
law.
Since 2011, Syria has been engulfed in a protracted civil war that
began as part of the wave of Arab Spring protests against Middle
East tyrants. 2 The Syrian conflict has seen the rise and fall of the
*

Dean of the Law School, Joseph C. Hostetler--BakerHostetler Professor
of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; co-founder and
Managing Director of the Public International Law & Policy Group;
former Attorney Adviser for United Nations Affairs, U.S. Department of
State. This essay is an edited version of a speech delivered at the
Frederick K. Cox International Law Center Conference, “International
Law and Policy in the Age of Trump,” at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law on September 14, 2018.

1.

Amnesty International State of the World’s Human Rights Annual
INTERNATIONAL,
Report
2017-2018,
AMNESTY
https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/amnesty-international-state-ofthe-worlds-human-rights-annual-report-2017-18/
[https://perma.cc/E9F2-FKFD] (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).

2.

See Timeline of Chemical Weapons Attacks in Syria, YAHOO! (Apr. 10,
2018),
https://www.yahoo.com/news/timeline-chemical-weaponsattacks-syria-170615069.html [https://perma.cc/7U95-YL6N] (detailing
the timeline of events related to Syria’s use of chemical weapons and the
U.S., French, and U.K. airstrikes).
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ISIS terrorist organization, 3 the largest refugee migration since World
War II, 4 and the repeated use of chemical weapons against a civilian
population. 5 With all that, Syria has become a dynamic laboratory
for the creation of new customary international law. Elsewhere, I have
explored how the use of force by the United States and its allies
against ISIS in Syria has fundamentally changed the international law
of self-defense against non-state actors. 6 This essay, in turn, examines
whether the April 2018 airstrikes against Syria may have constituted
a tipping point 7 in the evolving customary international law 8 of
humanitarian intervention.
3.

See Michael P. Scharf, How the War on ISIS Changed International
Law, 48 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L LAW 15 (2016) (discussing efforts of the
U.S. and other Western and Arab countries to defeat ISIS within Syria).

4.

See UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2018
Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, RELIEFWEB
(Nov. 21, 2017), https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/2018humanitarian-needs-overview-syrian-arab-republic-enar
[https://perma.cc/C9KT-DPVP] (discussing the impact of the Syrian
conflict, including the number of refugees); see also Laura Tavares, Text
to Text: Comparing Jewish Refugees of the 1930s With Syrian Refugees
TIMES
(Jan.
4,
2017),
Today,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/04/learning/lesson-plans/text-totext-comparing-jewish-refugees-of-the-1930s-with-syrian-refugeestoday.html [https://perma.cc/EH5R -ZXCL] (comparing the current
Syrian refugee crisis with the Jewish refugee crisis of World War II).

5.

See Timeline of Chemical Weapons Attacks in Syria, supra note 2
(outlining uses of chemical weapons on Syrian civilians).

6.

See Scharf, supra note 3.

7.

In my writings, I have described the tipping points and transformative
events that fundamentally change customary international law as
“Grotian Moments” -- a term named for Hugo Grotius, the 15th Century
Dutch scholar and diplomat whose masterpiece De Jure Belli ac Pacis
helped marshal in the modern system of international law. See generally,
MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE: RECOGNIZING GROTIAN MOMENTS (2014)
(discussing transformative events in international law). Grotius (1583–
1645) is widely considered to have laid the intellectual architecture for
the Peace of Westphalia, which launched the basic rules of modern
international law. HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 75-78
(Hedley Bull et al. eds., 1992). While the results of Westphalia may
have been simplified by the lens of history, and Grotius’ role may have
been exaggerated, Westphalia has unquestionably emerged as a symbolic
marker and Grotius as an emblematic figure of changing historical
thought. “Grotian Moment” is thus an apt label for transformational
events in customary international law.

8.

Customary international law means “those rules of international law
that derive from and reflect a general practice accepted as law.” Int’l
Law Comm’n, Second Rep. on the Identification of Customary
International Law, U.N. Dᴏᴄ. A/CN.4/672, 65 (May 22, 2014).
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The International Law Prohibiting Unauthorized
Humanitarian Intervention
In the 1986 Nicaragua Case, the International Court of Justice
observed that “[r]eliance by a State on a novel right or an
unprecedented exception to the principle [of non-intervention] might,
if shared in principle by other States, tend toward a modification of
customary international law.” 9 In the years since the 1999 NATO
airstrikes on Serbia to prevent the slaughter of the Kosovar
Albanians, 10 international law has been moving in fits and starts
toward recognition of a limited right of humanitarian intervention.
Under the conventional view of international law, use of force
against another State is legally justified only in three instances: (1)
with permission of the territorial state, (2) with the authorization of
the U.N. Security Council, or (3) when it constitutes self-defense in
response to an armed attack. 11 Humanitarian Intervention without
Security Council approval was not viewed as a valid justification. 12
However, the 1999 NATO intervention in Serbia saw a major
application of armed force for humanitarian purposes without Security
Council authorization, but with widespread support by the
international community. According to one scholar, the NATO
intervention was “a case that expanded, rather than breached, the
law, similar to the Truman proclamation about the continental
shelf.” 13 Others have described the NATO intervention as “a
watershed event” and “an important transition point in the shift from
9.

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 207 (June 27).

10.

Patrick T. Egan, The Kosovo Intervention and Collective Self-Defense, 8
INT’L PEACEKEEPING 39, 40 (2001).

11.

See Scharf, supra note 3, at 22.

12.

Prior to the 1999 NATO bombing campaign, there had been several
cases where foreign intervention was employed to halt widespread
atrocities without Security Council approval. Hence, India stopped the
slaughter in East Pakistan in 1971, Tanzania ended Idi Amin’s mass
killing in Uganda in 1979, and Vietnam’s intervention brought an end to
Pol Pot’s killing fields in Cambodia in 1978. But unlike the 1999
Kosovo intervention, in these three cases self-defense, rather than
humanitarian concern, was the primary justification asserted. The fact
that the intervening States relied on self-defense, rather than asserting a
right to humanitarian intervention, undermined arguments that the law
had changed. Nicholas J. Wheeler, Reflections on the Legality and
Legitimacy of NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo, in THE KOSOVO
TRAGEDY: THE HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSIONS 145, 150 (Ken Booth ed.,
2001).

13.

Fernando R. Teson, Kosovo: A Powerful Precedent for the Doctrine of
Humanitarian Intervention, 1 AMSTERDAM L. F. 42, 43 (2009).
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one international order to the next.” 14 Moreover, the NATO
intervention led to the ICISS’s articulation of the Responsibility to
Protect doctrine, a concept that has been described as the “most
dramatic normative development of our time” 15 and a “revolution in
consciousness in international affairs.” 16 The 2001 ICISS Report
characterized the responsibility to protect as an emerging principle of
customary international law, 17 and the 2005 High-level Panel Report
described it as an “emerging norm,” 18 an assessment shared by the
Secretary-General. 19
Yet, a major roadblock prevented humanitarian intervention
without Security Council authorization from ripening into a norm of
customary international law on the basis of the 1999 NATO action:
the participating NATO States were not comfortable with the idea
that the bombing campaign would create a new rule of customary
international law justifying a broad notion of unilateral humanitarian
intervention that could be subject to abuse. 20 Thus, in July 1999, U.S.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stressed that the air strikes
were a “unique situation sui generis in the region of the Balkans,”
concluding that it was important “not to overdraw the various lessons
that come out of it.” 21 And UK Prime Minister Tony Blair similarly

14.

Heiko Borchert & Mary N. Hampton, The Lessons of Kosovo: Boon or
Bust for Transatlantic Security?, ORBIS 369 (2002).

15.

Ramesh Thakur & Thomas G. Weis, R2P: From Idea to Norm – and
Action?, 1 GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 22, 23 (2009).

16.

Jeremy Sarkin, Is the Responsibility to Protect an Accepted Norm of
International Law in the post-Libya Era?, 1 GRONINGEN J. OF INT’L L.
11, 16 (2012) (quoting Tod Lindberg, Blog, Protect the People, TOD
LINDBERG,
(Sept.
27,
2005),
https://todlindberg.net/2005/09/27/protect-the-people/#more-415
[https://perma.cc/RL3P-W36V]).

17.

THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, INT’L COMM’N
STATE SOVEREIGNTY [ICISS] ¶ 2.24, 6.17 (2001).

18.

U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility: Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change, ¶ 203, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).

19.

See generally U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards
Development, Security, and Human Rights for All, ¶ 135, U.N. Doc.
A/59/2005/Add.3 (May 26, 2005) (affirming the U.N.’s responsibility to
protect human rights around the world).

20.

Anne-Sophie Massa, Does Humanitarian Intervention Serve Human
Rights? The Case of Kosovo, 1 AMSTERDAM L. F. 49, 58-59 (2009).

21.

Madeleine Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, Press
Conference with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, (July 26, 1999),
available
at
http://secretary.state.gov./www/statements/1999/
990726b.html [https://perma.cc/HU66-BVL7].
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emphasized the exceptional nature of the Kosovo operation and the
limited precedent it created. 22
The reason for the reluctance of the United States and United
Kingdom to acknowledge a precedent that could ripen into customary
international law was explained by Michael Matheson, the Acting
Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State at the time of the
intervention, in the following terms:
“About six months before the actual conflict, at the time when
NATO was considering giving an order to threaten the use of
force, the political community of NATO got together and had a
discussion about what the basis of such threat of force would be.
At the end of the discussion, it was clear that there was no
common agreement on what might be the justification. There
were some NATO members who were prepared to base it on a
new doctrine of humanitarian intervention; but most members
of the NATO Council were reluctant to adopt a relatively openended new doctrine. So at the end of that week, the NATO
political community said, here is a list of all of the important
reasons why it is necessary for us to threaten the use of force.
And at the bottom, it said that under these unique
circumstances, we think such actions would be legitimate.
There was deliberate evasion of making a “legal” assertion.
And this same process occurred in the U.S. Government. There
were some who wanted to articulate that humanitarian
intervention is now the basis for U.S. action. There was
another theory from the Department of Defense, which wanted
to adopt sort of an expanded idea of self-defense based on the
general interest of the United States in the region; but on
reflection, nobody was really prepared to throw all the eggs into
either of those baskets. So we ended up with a formulation
similar to that of NATO, where we listed all of the reasons why
we were taking action and, in the end, mumbled something
about its being justifiable and legitimate but not a precedent.
So in a sense, it was something less than a definitive legal
rationale – although it probably was taken by large parts of the
public community as something like that.” 23

When the principal State actors assert that their actions are sui
generis and not intended to constitute precedent, this does not create

22.

330 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (1999) col. 30 (UK).

23.

MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN
TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE
DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER 124-125 (2010) (quoting remarks by
Michael Matheson).
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a favorable climate for the cultivation of a new rule of customary
international law. 24
In the years since the 1999 NATO action, countries have used
force for humanitarian purposes without Security Council
authorization on several other occasions, including the U.S./U.K
imposition of a no-fly zone over Iraq to protect the Marsh Arabs from
Saddam Hussein’s reprisals, 25 the Russian invasion of South Ossetia
Georgia ostensibly to protect ethnic Russians living there from
attack, 26 and the U.S. airstrikes against the ISIS terrorist group to
save the besieged Yazidis on Mount Sinjar, Iraq. 27 But never before
the April 14, 2018 airstrikes had humanitarian use of force been
accompanied by a clear legal justification based on a right of
humanitarian intervention. Two former State Department Legal
Advisers, Harold Koh and John Bellinger, have criticized the United
States’ failure to articulate a legal argument for its past humanitarian
interventions. 28
For customary international law to rapidly
crystallize, norm pioneers must be consistent in their articulation of

24.

Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10
EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 1, 19-20 (1999).

25.

363 Parl Deb HC (2001) col. 620 (UK).

26.

Brian Barbour & Brian Gorlick, Embracing the ‘Responsibility to
Protect’: A Repertoire of Measures Including Asylum for Potential
Victims, 20 INT’L J. OF REFUGEE L. 533, 559 (2008).

27.

See Helene Cooper & Michael D. Shear, Militants’ Siege on Mountain in
Iraq is Over, Pentagon Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/14/world/middleeast/iraq-yazidirefugees.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3ZGC-NHW4]; see also Helene
Cooper et al., Obama Allows Limited Airstrikes on ISIS, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug.
7,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/08/world/middleeast/obamaweighs-military-strikes-to-aid-trapped-iraqis-officials-say.html
[https://perma.cc/JNW4-2D82].

28.

John Bellinger, The Trump Administration Should Do More to Explain
the Legal Basis for the Syrian Airstrikes, LAWFARE: INTERNATIONAL
LAW, (Apr. 14, 2018, 4:46 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/trumpadministration-should-do-more-explain-legal-basis-syrian-airstrikes
[https://perma.cc/YAA6-RNM2] (noting Bellinger’s testimony before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “[w]hen the United States
uses military force, especially under controversial circumstances, it
should explain the legal basis for its actions. When the United States
does not do so, it appears to act lawlessly and invites other countries to
act without a legal basis or justification.”); see also Harold Hongju Koh,
The Legal Adviser’s Duty to Explain, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. 189, 204
(2016); see also Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and
Humanitarian Intervention, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 971, 977 (2016) (“I
thought it outrageous that the U.S. government would fail to state a
legal rationale to justify its use of force.”).
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the new rule, its contours, and its application. 29 The failure to do so
not only makes it harder for customary international law to form, but
at the same time it makes it easier for the precedent to be abused by
other countries since its contours are left purposely ambiguous.

What Made the 2018 Airstrikes Different?
In contrast to the prior cases, the countries participating in the
April 2018 airstrikes on Syria embraced a common justification—
humanitarian
intervention—rather
than
cite only
factual
considerations that render use of force morally defensible as they had
in the past. The United Kingdom was the most explicit of the three,
telling the Security Council that its actions were legally justified on
the basis of “humanitarian intervention” in the context of preventing
use of chemical weapons. 30 It stated that “[a]ny State is permitted
under international law, on an exceptional basis, to take measures in
order to alleviate overwhelming humanitarian suffering.” 31
The UK maintained that such humanitarian intervention is lawful
when three conditions are met:
(1)“First, there must be convincing evidence, generally accepted
by the international community as a whole, of extreme
humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate and
urgent relief. …
(2)Secondly, it must be objectively clear that there is no
practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be
saved. …
(3)Thirdly, the proposed use of force must be necessary and
proportionate to the aim of relief of humanitarian suffering. It
must be strictly limited in time and in scope to this aim.” 32

The United Kingdom then detailed why it reasonably considers
that the airstrikes met these requirements, concluding “[t]here was no
29.

SCHARF, supra note 7, at 1-5.

30.

Theresa May, Prime Minister, Prime Minister’s Office, Syria action –
UK government legal position, (April 14, 2018), available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/syria-action-ukgovernment-legal-position/syria-action-uk-government-legal-position
[https://perma.cc/RK2D-XWNS] (“The UK is permitted under
international law, on an exceptional basis, to take measures in order to
alleviate overwhelming humanitarian suffering. The legal basis for the
use of force is humanitarian intervention….”).

31.

U.N. SCOR, 73d Sess., 8233d mtg. at 6-7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8233 (Apr.
14, 2018).

32.

Id. at 7.
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practicable alternative to the truly exceptional use of force to degrade
the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons capability and deter their
further use by the Syrian regime in order to alleviate humanitarian
suffering.” 33 This clearly articulated legal rationale distinguishes the
2018 airstrikes from the NATO action in 1999. While the UK had
first made public its views on humanitarian intervention in 2014,34
this was the first time the rationale was tied to concrete action taken
by armed UK forces.
Although the United States did not similarly articulate a detailed
justification, it did tell the Security Council that “[t]he United States
is deeply grateful to the United Kingdom and France for their part in
the coalition to defend the prohibition of chemical weapons. We
worked in lock step; we were in complete agreement.” 35 As such, the
United States can be held to have implicitly adopted the rationale of
the United Kingdom. 36 This is particularly significant because the
United States has never before recognized a right of humanitarian
intervention under international law. 37
In contrast to its statements following the U.S. airstrikes on
Syria’s Shayrat airbase a year earlier, it is significant that in April
2018 the United States did not employ the language of armed reprisal,
as such is considered unlawful under international law. 38 Thus, at the
United Nations, the U.S. Ambassador stated, “[t]he United Kingdom,
France, and the United States acted not in revenge, not in
punishment and not in a symbolic show of force. We acted to deter
33.

May, supra note 30.

34.

Further Supplementary Written Evidence from the Rt Hon Hugh
Robertson, MP, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office to
the Foreign Affairs Committee on Humanitarian Intervention and the
Responsibility to Protect, January 14, 2014, available at
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmdfence
/582/58205.htm [https://perma.cc/X2PM-ERPF].

35.

U.N. SCOR, 73d Sess., 8233d mtg, supra note 31, at 6 (Emphasis
added).

36.

See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. of the International Law Commission on
the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 52-54 (2001)
(citing international cases where a State’s unequivocal acknowledgment
and adoption of another’s position will render the State retroactively
responsible for it).

37.

See Stephen Wertheim, A Solution from Hell: the United States and the
Rise of Humanitarian Interventionism, 1991-2003, 12 J. OF GENOCIDE
RES. 149, (2010) (discussing the United States initial reluctance to adopt
humanitarian interventionism); see also Koh, The War Powers and
Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 28.

38.

See Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Popular but Unlawful Armed Reprisal,
44 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 325, 338-345 (2018) (discussing the illegality and
background on the prohibition of armed reprisals).
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the future use of chemical weapons by holding the Syrian regime
responsible for its crimes against humanity.” 39
Importantly, the underlying humanitarian need in the case of the
April 2018 airstrikes was to stop the use of chemical weapons against
a civilian population – a jus cogens norm. 40 Rather than target
infrastructure, airfields, or government buildings, as had been the case
of past humanitarian interventions, the targets of the April 2018
strikes were chemical weapons production and storage facilities.41
While a wider principle of humanitarian intervention might be too
much for the international community to buy into at this time, the
large majority of States supported or declined to protest the April
2018 airstrikes out of concern with the Assad regime’s attempt to
normalize the use of chemical weapons and Russia’s willingness to
prevent the Security Council from taking action against Syria 42
Finally, out of a total of seventy States that publicly commented
at the United Nations or elsewhere, only a small handful of countries
said they opposed the April 2018 airstrikes, 43 And only Russia, China,
39.

U.N. SCOR, 73d Sess., 8233d mtg, supra note 31, at 5.

40.

Charlie Dunlap, Do the Syria Strikes Herald a New Norm of
(Apr.
14,
2018),
International
Law?,
LAWFARE
https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2018/04/14/do-the-syria-strikes-herald-anew-norm-of-international-law/ [https://perma.cc/VK9N-8385]. The
term “jus cogens” designates a peremptory principle or norm from which
no derogation is permitted. Jus cogens norms are recognized as being
fundamental to the maintenance of the international legal order.

41.

Id. The 1999 NATO airstrikes comprised a 78-day bombing campaign of
Serbia’s infrastructure, military targets, and government buildings.
Serbia marks anniversary of start of NATO bombing, B92 (Mar. 24,
2016),
https://www.b92.net/eng/news/society.php?yyyy=2016&mm=03&dd=2
4&nav_id=97466 [https://perma.cc/89RZ-EU84]. The April 2017
airstrikes targeted an airbase in general use. Michael R. Gordon et al.,
Dozens of U.S. Missiles Hit Air Base in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (April 6,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/world/ middleeast/ussaid-to-weigh-military-responses-to-syrian-chemical-attack.html
[https://perma.cc/B3EX-2CNP].

42.

Jan Lemnitzer, Syria Strikes Violated International Law – Are the Rules
of Foreign Intervention Changing?, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 18, 2018,
6:57
AM),
http://theconversation.com/syria-strikes-violatedinternational-law-are-the-rules-of-foreign-intervention-changing-95184
[https://perma.cc/H2CE-23K8].

43.

Fifty-six separate states and NATO (consisting of 28 member States) –
for a total of over seventy countries -- publicly expressed opinions about
the April 14, 2018 airstrikes. Alonso Gurmendi Dunkelberg et al.,
Mapping States Reactions to the Syria Strikes of April 2018, JUST
SECURITY
(Apr.
22,
2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org
/55157/mapping-states-reactions-syria-strikes-april-2018/
[https://perma.cc/8QZD-3ZWQ].
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and Bolivia voted for the Security Council resolution condemning the
attack. 44 Russia’s opposition to the claim that the airstrikes were
justified as humanitarian intervention was weakened by its argument
that Syria’s responsibility for the chemical attack had not been
sufficiently proven, 45 and by the fact that it had itself invoked the
right of humanitarian intervention just ten years earlier in the case of
South Ossetia, Georgia. 46 Similarly China’s position was weakened by
its failure to object to the United States’ airstrikes against the Syrian
airfield in 2017, and the fact that its vote in April 2018 came at the
height of a U.S.-China trade war. 47
Some commentators have argued that even if there was a newly
emergent customary international law right to humanitarian
intervention, customary international law simply cannot prevail over

44.

U.N. SCOR, Russian Federation Draft Resolution, UN Doc. S/2018/355
(Apr. 14, 2018). The draft resolution stated:
“The Security Council,
Appalled by the aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic by
the US and its allies in violation of international law and the
UN Charter,
Expressing grave concern that the aggression against the
sovereign territory of the Syrian Arab Republic took place at the
moment when the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons Fact-Finding Mission team has just begun its work to
collect evidence of the alleged use of chemical weapons in
Douma and urging to provide all necessary conditions for the
completion of this investigation,
1. Condemns the aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic
by the US and its allies in violation of international law and the
UN Charter,
2. Demands that the US and its allies immediately and without
delay cease the aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic and
demands also to refrain from any further use of force in violation
of international law and the UN Charter,
3. Decides to remain further seized on this matter.”

45.

U.N. SCOR, 73d Sess., 8233d mtg, supra note 31, at 3-5. Russia told the
Security Council, “Just as it did a year ago, when it attacked Syria’s AlShayrat airbase in Syria, the United States took a staged use of toxic
substances against civilians as a pretext, this time in Douma, outside
Damascus. Having visited the site of the alleged incident, Russian
military experts found no traces of chlorine or any other toxic agent.”
Id. at 3.

46.

Barbour & Gorlick, supra note 26; see also RONALD D. ASMUS, A LITTLE
WAR THAT SHOOK THE WORLD: GEORGIA, RUSSIA, AND THE FUTURE OF
THE WEST 8 (2010) (introducing the conflict in South Ossetia).

47.

A Timeline of the U.S. and China Trade War, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July
6, 2018), https://www.digitalcommerce 360.com/2018/07/06/timeline-of-thetrump-china-trade-war/ [https://perma.cc/C2PB-G547].
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the U.N. Charter. 48 But as former State Department Legal Adviser
Harold Koh points out, “[it] is not nearly so black and white as the
absolutists claim, because textual ambiguity in Article 2(4), the
broader structural purposes of the U.N. Charter, and some recent
significant state practice give far more legal play in the joints than
textual absolutists would concede.” 49 If the right of humanitarian
intervention in response to use of chemical weapons now exists under
customary international law, then such humanitarian intervention
would not be in violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter because
that provision only prohibits the use of force that is “against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state” and
“inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” 50
Humanitarian intervention, in contrast, is consistent with the
Charter’s Purposes and Principles, which include “maintain[ing]
international peace and security,” “promoting and encouraging respect
for human rights,” and “sav[ing] succeeding generations from the
scourge of war.” 51 Humanitarian intervention in response to the use of
chemical weapons is not seeking to threaten the integrity of a State
nor bring about political change, but only to save lives and enforce
the global ban on chemical weapons. 52

Conclusion
Since the Security Council declined to condemn the April 2018
airstrikes on Syria, the question that this essay addresses—whether a
limited customary international law right of humanitarian
intervention has crystallized from the 2018 Syrian airstrikes—may not
require a definitive answer at this time as there is no pending
International Court of Justice or International Criminal Court case
arguing that the strikes were an unlawful act of aggression.
Nevertheless, a strong case can be made that the April 2018 airstrikes
48.

See, e.g., Dapo Akande, The Legality of the UK’s Air Strikes on the
Assad Government in Syria (Apr. 6, 2018), available at
https://www.scribd.com/document/3y76483861/Akande-Opinion-UKGovernment-s-Legal-Position-on-Syria-Strike-April-2018 (opinion letter
prepared for MP Tom Watson, Deputy Leader of the UK Labour
Party).

49.

Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 28,
at 1017.

50.

Richard Ware, Briefing Paper: The Legal Basis for Air Strikes Against
Syrian Government Targets, House of Commons Library (Apr. 16,
2018),
available
at
https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/
CBP-8287 [https://perma.cc/5XEV-UJER].

51.

U.N. Charter art. 1 ¶ 1; U.N. Charter pmbl.

52.

Ware, supra note 50.
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constituted a tipping point for humanitarian intervention. Advocates
of a right of humanitarian intervention should be careful, however, in
reading this development too broadly, for there is unlikely to be
widespread international approval at this time for its application
outside the context of responding to repeated use of chemical weapons
against civilians.
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